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The recent excellent paper by Birnie and Brownlow shows that Great 
Britain (GB)-Northern Ireland (NI) trade flows amounted to roughly the 
sum of those between NI and the Republic of Ireland (ROI), the rest of 
the European Union (EU) and the rest of the World[1]. But, as a 
consequence of the NI Protocol (NIP), negotiated as part of the EU 
Withdrawal Act (WA), so as to avoid a hard border between the two 
parts of Ireland, non-tariff barriers have been erected within the UK 
internal market. As Birnie and Brownlow note: 
Nineteenth-century Prussian chief of the general staff Helmuth von 
Moltke declared, ‘No plan survives contact with the enemy’. Only 
weeks after the end of the Brexit transition period on 31 December 
2020, plans for handling Brexit in Northern Ireland  (NI) have been 
bruised by contact with reality. 
It was reported in the Financial Times that the leadership of the 
Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) had previously lobbied the UK 
Government to negotiate a Swiss-style agreement to avoid the current 
creating complications around taxes, tariffs and regulatory compliance 
as a result of the application of the NIP. They have denied this but are 
seeking a judicial review of the NIP joining the other Unionist parties 
in this endeavour. Perhaps wiser counsel would have pointed these 
parties to assess (and possibly challenge) the Supreme Court 
judgement of 2017 of the Sewell Convention that applies when the UK 
Parliament wants to legislate on a matter within the devolved 
territories. It ruled that it is a political convention that has no 
constitutional force.  This political manoeuvring to undermine the NIP 
appears to be another Brexit mutation as its pandemic quality extends 
its economic challenges for regions and sectors in what appears to be 
the failing Union of the UK. 
Northern Ireland’s Unique Challenges 
The unique constitutional position of NI and its relationship to the ROI 
appears to be poorly understood by many commentators, particularly 
in England. In a sense, NI was always a hybrid economy that given 
many parts of its function as part of an all-Ireland economy single 
market, but the perverse effects of the NIP have reinforced this.  The 
NIP as the compromise from the rejection of the NI backstop is 
actually a worse outcome in the effective border down the Irish Sea 
with its asymmetric trade effects. It appears to follow that hybridity and 
perversity appear to be combining into a heady brew that may be too 
intoxicating in the short to medium term. 
The NI Economy Department produced a paper in December 2020 on 
the direct economic impact of the NIP based upon a number of 
scenarios. The nearest one to the current trade deal shows forecasts 
for the long-term impact (15 years) on Gross Value-Added (GVA) and 
employment by sector as displayed in the figure below.  We can see 
that the Agri-food sector as a whole could be worst affected, 
exacerbated by the impact of and policy responses to Covid-19. More 
importantly, the current increased transaction costs imposed on this 
sector, as a result of the need for customs declarations and health 
certificates, is reinforcing NI’s hybrid status within the UK. 
In the case of mince and sausage meats there is a grace period of 6 
months for these types of product originating from GB. In the case of 
other Agri-food products they have been banned since 1st January 
2021. One conclusion is that there is a perverse incentive for NI to 
produce these products that could then be exported to the ROI and 
the rest of the EU given its Single Market and Customs Union 
alignment.  A similar argument holds for other key sectors, for 
example new business and professional services associated with 
managing the new customs and regulatory arrangements, if they are 
located in NI. These are more medium-term prospects, however, but 
even with optimism bias for, say, key sectors like aerospace we are in 
the Donald Rumsfeld realm of “known unknowns” and “unknown 
unknowns” regarding uncertainty: itself a cause of increase 
transactions costs. Given these possibilities it can be speculated that 
the NIP is effectively the only industrial strategy in town for Northern 
Ireland. 
 
The Dance of Industrial Strategy in Northern Ireland 
History can be described as a dance to the music of time, in which 
different rhythms accompany the changing years and seasons. Such 
a description could equally apply to public policy, especially industrial 
strategy and associated outcomes in NI. The last proposal 
was Economy2030: A consultation on Industrial Strategy for Northern 
Ireland published in 2017. Its overview is shown graphically below that 
could be written for any economic development strategy, whose 
context can be danced around by policy makers anywhere. 
 
The objectives of Economy2030 are to position the NI Economy 
competitively using global competitive indicators (of the kind beloved 
by the World Economic Forum) against other economies. These 
include the ROI; Scotland, Denmark: Finland; Estonia; Israel; 
Singapore and New Zealand: an eccentric mix to say the least. There 
is no analysis of the impact of Brexit that is the driving force for the 
outcomes of the NIP, or that the majority of NI’s electorate voted to 
remain in the EU it in the 2016 Referendum. Yet in adapting to the 
perplexing circumstances of the NIP, businesses and consumers in NI 
are current being beset by its potential industrial policy applications 
that  are possibly damaging. In the present environment hybridity 
appears to meet perversity. 
What is to Done? 
“What is to be done?” is the title of Lenin’s essay on the future of the 
Russian Revolution. In a sense, NI is facing a revolutionary situation 
in the face of the triple whammy of Brexit, the NIP and whole of 
Ireland being hard hit by Covid-19. The challenges are that there is a 
tendency at times of crisis for hubris to dominate politics and 
economics in NI. In the current situation this assertion could equally 
apply to the UK government exacerbated by a sense of disinterest in 
all things Irish among the English commentariat.  The pressures to 
return to the hubristic economics of austerity are ever present in 
Westminster in whatever outcomes post-Covid brings. For NI this 
would be severely damaging as it adjusts to its new strategic position 
with respect to the whole of Ireland and the EU27. 
The danger is that this resolution will not occur by the time of the 2024 
review of the NIP that coincides with the next UK General Election. 
here may some be institutional light at end of the tunnel if the current 
economic challenges are resolved to some extent. Much of solving 
these challenges rest with the Joint Committee, as part of the EUWA. 
Part of that institutional light is The Open University: the largest UK 
university and the only all-Ireland one. One can look at other current 
and future cross-border and GB-NI institutional arrangements that 
may also be helpful in this regard.   At present, the concern is that 
rather than being a hybrid economy, NI is becoming a hokey-cokey: 
putting its left and right legs in and out and shaking them all about. 
 (1) https://www.economicsobservatory.com/how-is-brexit-affecting-
northern-irelands-economy 
 
 
